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INSTITUTIONALIZING CO-PRODUCTION 
IN THE CONSERVATION AND 
RENEWAL OF RESIDENTIAL URBAN 
HERITAGES IN SHANGHAI:
The Obstacles and Solutions
Abstract: In Shanghai, the spatial division inside residential heritages is intricate. Even the smallest top-down 
renewal projects involve several households’ interests. Without an “empowered participatory governance” (Fung 
and Wright 2003), communities tend to form intense exclusion, refusing government interventions (Tallon 2013). 
Under such background, in 2017, the author accompanied a co-producing renewal process along with the Shanghai 
Xuhui district and communities.  
This paper reviews the co-production theory, summarizes its advantages of meeting individual demands and 
utilizing residents’ initiative inputs, its nature of breaking current rules and using conflicts tactics, as well as its 
drawbacks of potential structural and fire-fighting dangers of buildings, as shown in the “Dream Home” TV program. 
Then the paper examines the case of No.620 West Jianguo Road, a pilot project of institutionalizing the co-production, 
aiming at bringing out its merits and eliminating its defects. Two obstacles in this process are elaborated and the 
reasons for them are analyzed: a) The intricate interests within residents are hard to coordinate only by designers, 
but the current mechanism doesn’t enable the residents to reach a consensus beforehand or integrate them into the 
design phase. b) The division of ownership and use-right in the history causes unequal duties and rights and mutually 
restricted power between the residents and the state, resulting in the state’s inability to occupy or repair its property 
as well as the reluctance to support the residents’ initiative repair.
Afterward, the paper proposes corresponding solutions based on relevant practical references, focusing on 
optimizing and deepening the mechanism of state-community engagement in the residential renewal, and adjusting 
the rights, responsibilities, and benefits of the owners and users.  
To sum up, this research suggests that a “public-sector led” co-production may be still possible, with a changed 
power balance and certain modification to the current rules, and could achieve unexpected results when the state 
has difficulty in delivering services; whereas the shift of planners’ roles indicates that empowerment may be 
gradually taking place.
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INTRODUCTION 
Shanghai has a wealth of residential historic urban 
heritage resources, with a large area and a wide range, 
including numerous high-quality residential buildings, 
apartments, and garden houses. However, long-term, 
over-loaded, and extensive use has accelerated the 
aging of the buildings, causing their living environment 
to deteriorate continuously, making their protection and 
renewal often unsatisfactory.
For a long time, relocating the residents as a whole 
and adjusting the buildings’ function were among the 
main approaches to renewing historic blocks, which, 
however, left two drawbacks: a) The buildings with lower 
protection-degree and less-prominent historic value, or 
those, whose stock is still large, are often demolished 
and replaced with high-rise buildings by developers in 
the desire for the maximum economic benefit. b) The 
removal of many indigenous residents in a short time 
causes irreparable damage to the communities’ social 
networks, as well as an abnormal growth of social 
structure and urban fabric in the region.
The ever-increasing costs and the difficulty of 
resettlement drove Shanghai to seek a new method of 
redevelopment and resulted in the city’s clear statement 
in 2016 that 7.3 million square meters of traditional 
dwellings in the central city should be conserved. Since 
the gradual decrease of the excessive residents’ amount 
still takes a considerably long time, the government 
undertook the improvement of the interior living 
condition of historic buildings step by step, expecting 
that residents’ private investment can be incentivized 
through public investments like the addition of a private 
kitchen and bathroom.
However, this “indoor spatial renewal” faced no 
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Shanghai’s residential heritage is quite complex, and 
even the tiniest top-down renewal projects involve the 
interests of several households. Without “empowered 
participatory governance” (Fung and Wright 2003), 
communities tend to form strong oppositions and resist 
the government’s intervention (Tallon 2013).
A typical case is Jukui New Village (figure 1), a 
community with three-story historic buildings built in the 
planned economy era. It lacks kitchen and bathroom 
facilities, but has a large number of households and 
informal construction: 262 of the 309 households in 
the community constructed 432 illegal structures; the 
original 2 to 3 meter-wide alleys were gradually eroded 
by the residents’ self-constructed “small compartments”; 
the spontaneous structures were built up to six floors 
tall, supported by a mere two thin steel pipes. All of 
these caused damage to the architecture and brought 
about security risks. In 2016, the government began 
to renovate the buildings and tried to add private 
kitchens and bathrooms for the residents as much as 
possible. The results of the repair were acknowledged 
and praised by the residents and the public at first, 
however, after a few months, nearly 70% of the residents 
petitioned and complained. The reason is that, after 
comparing with each other, the residents found that due 
to various considerations, such as construction quality 
and the interior spatial layout, the space added by the 
designers to each household was not completely equal, 
causing strong dissatisfaction among the residents. At 
that time, the residents had already signed agreements 
with the government and moved back in, and the design 
could not be changed anymore. Residents believed that, 
since the repair work was led by the government, the 
“loss” caused by the uneven distribution of interests 
should be compensated by the government as well. 
In the end, the government was overwhelmed with 
responsibilities, and the preservation and renovation 
became stuck in a deadlocked situation. 
Given this context, the Shanghai Xuhui District 
Housing Management Bureau proposed to explore a 
method of “co-producing residential renewal”, expecting 
to resolve conflicts of interests and achieve satisfactory 
renewal results, by encouraging residents’ initiative 
action and acknowledging their contributions and 
efforts in the renewal.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
1.1. INTERNATIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
CO-PRODUCTION 
Co-production is a term of state-society engagement 
around urban development issues, which is often related 
to the cases (especially in the global South), in which 
the poor communities rely on their capability to improve 
their living conditions. Its background is the obvious 
progressive ineffectiveness of formal democracy in 
achieving the democratic political ideal (Fung and 
Wright 2003). Therefore, an “empowered participatory 
governance” with an institutional design is needed, 
which counts on the input and ability of ordinary people, 
and ties action to debates (Fung and Wright 2003). 
This also indicates the state-society engagement has 
entered a “post-collaborative” phase, with the focus 
shifting to the difficulties met in the process, as well as 
the context and conditions in which participation takes 
place (Brownill and Parker 2010).
The term “co-production” originated from the 
political economist Elinor Ostrom in 1996 and was 
defined as a process where the inputs of individuals 
not in the same group are transformed into goods 
and services (Ostrom 1996). It emphasizes the 
complementary advantages of the government (in 
resources, technical experts, and trunk service) and 
communities (in local information, time, skills, and feeder 
service), which generates a synergistic effect leading to 
better results. Compared with the former concepts of 





“collaborative” and “communicative” planning, these three 
concepts are not approaches to radical social changes, 
but about state-society cooperation in improving the 
citizens’ living conditions(Watson 2014). However, the 
co-producing method often inevitably goes beyond, 
or even counter to the existing governance rules, and 
underscores the importance of communities’ gradual 
empowerment (Watson 2014), while the other two 
concepts are always carried out within the existing rules, 
regarding power only in deliberative planning process 
and assuming its destructive effect can be overcome 
through debate (Huxley 2000).
Co-production has different variants interpreted by 
scholars. Bovaird (2007) argues co-producing means 
a redistribution of power, which is highly political and 
could result in undesirable social effects; it is, therefore, 
necessary to “reserve power of state regulation”. 
Whereas the social movement initiated co-production 
affords power against that of the state, with community 
organizations and NGOs playing an important role, 
its practice could be a combination of both conflict 
(protests for example) and cooperation (Bradlow 2013).
Traditional planning tools like survey and mapping, 
which used to be held within the government, are 
seen by co-production as a combination of power and 
knowledge and used by marginalized groups to claim 
space and speak back to the state (Watson 2014). 
In some cases, the whole process from the survey, 
visioning, and construction to management has been 
undertaken by the community, is referred to as a 
self-mapping and approved by the state; the role of 
the state here lies mainly in granting land and tenure, 
and providing larger infrastructure (Archer 2012). 
Correspondingly, architects and urban planners also 
shift from “know-all” professional experts to community 
supporters, in the recognition that “only the poor know 
how to live in poverty.” Co-production argues that 
planners should “offer right guidance rather than control 
the whole progress”, should “ask right questions” rather 
than provide answers, should play a “teaching role” to 
train communities towards sustainable development 
without the planners’ intervention (Archer et al. 2012).
What is noticeable here is that power and conflicts 
within the community need paying attention to (Robins 
et al. 2008). As well, the form and effectiveness of co-
production may differ in alternate contexts. Although 
co-production is a more radical method seeking the 
“fundamental change of the power balance,” it could still 
be “public-sector led” (Albrechts 2013).
1.2. THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CO-PRODUCTION 
IN CHINA 
In China, with the economic system reform deepening, 
the community has gradually taken on more social tasks 
and became the focus of urban governance. Its essence 
lies in advocating the dispersion of power and adopting 
a city development method with local suitability and 
uniqueness (Wang 2006). 
In recent years, with regard to the “co-producing” 
preservation and renewal of residential urban heritages, 
Chinese scholars have proposed different institutional 
construction strategies, such as the establishment of a 
communication and dialogue mechanism like hearings 
and workshops (Zhang 2004), the appointment of 
community planners (Ye 2006), the introduction of 
non-profit organizations to mediate the contradictions 
in urban renewal (Hong L. 2013), and the empowerment 
of neighborhood committees to manage communities’ 
public welfare affairs on their own (Ouyang 2015). 
Strategies of adjusting the property rights’ relationship 
were put forward as well, such as the privatization 
of property rights (Xiao 2004), the socialization of 
property rights (Wang et al. 2004), or the public-private-
shared ownership of property rights (Guo 2007), etc., 
aiming at encouraging residents’ investment and 
dedication in housing protection and repair, through the 
establishment of a differentiated property rights system. 
However, scholars generally believe that the current 
depth and breadth of residents’ engagement is far from 
enough, and its participant, organizational capacity, 
and impact on planning is still weak when lacking 
professional support (Hong and Zhao 2013; Zhao and Li 
2015; Ouyang and Ye 2015).
1.3. “DREAM HOME” PROGRAM AS AN 
ENLIGHTENMENT
A TV Program from Shanghai called “Dream Home” took 
the lead in introducing a new situation of “co-producing” 
residential renewal methods. In this program, the 
households living in historic buildings (often owned by 
the state) ask the TV station for renovation help and the 
TV group invites architects to create interior designs. 
The results show that such renovation focused on 
residents’ individual demands, motivates the initiative of 
residents’ repairs, has high repair efficiency, generates 
satisfactory results, and fosters the community’s 
acquisition of knowledge by showing and learning by 
doing (McFarlane 2011), and thus has received a lot of 
praise and attention from the academy. On the other 
hand, this method also received criticism from the 
government departments (i.e. the district real estate 
corporation and the housing management department). 
Due to the lack of institutionalized rules and residents’ 
and designers’ inadequate knowledge of housing 
structure and heritage protection, renovations often dig 
the foundation or remove load-bearing walls to improve 
the indoor spatial layout, resulting in damage to the 
historic buildings’ integrity and safety, which also runs 
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counter to the goal of historic preservation and the 
improvement of residents’ living conditions.
However, because of the potential it has, the 
housing management department of Xuhui District of 
Shanghai still decided to institutionalize this renewal 
method, with the residents’ self-conducted repair 
standardized and guided. No. 620 West Jianguo Road 
was chosen as a pilot case.
2. A CASE OF INSTITUTIONALIZING CO-PRODUCING 
RESIDENTIAL RENEWAL: NO.620 WEST JIANGUO 
ROAD
No. 620 West Jianguo Road (figure 2) is a three-story 
garden house built in 1924, adjacent to the Polish 
consulate, and acknowledged as an outstanding 
historical building. It covers an area of about 130 
m2, with a brick and wood structure in the German 
Jugendstil. The building was once used as a 
kindergarten and later assigned to the kindergarten 
staff as a welfare house, with a modified layout. After a 
long period of development, there are currently fourteen 
households in this building, with a total area of less than 
400 m2. The residential density far exceeds the initial 
design parameters.
Each floor can be divided into two parts: private 
rooms, where households live, and public spaces, 
where two small washrooms and a kitchen are located 
and shared by the residents living on the same floor. 
The public space is divided intricately and occupied by 
different households following an unwritten rule. The 
smallest household living area is only 5.8 m2, located 
on the ground floor, and the overall living condition is 
sub-standard.
In March 2017, the Xuhui District Government 
researched the conservation and repair plan for the 
building, aiming to improve the internal living conditions, 
according to the residents’ demands and with their own 
engagement. A design team from Tongji University was 
entrusted with coordination, in which the author is also a 
key member. During the community sessions, residents 
generally expressed their hopes for individual private 
kitchens and washrooms, and the designers started 
to develop a plan based on this request. However, the 
institutionalizing process of co-production revealed that 
two obstacles still need to be tackled. 
2.1. FIRST OBSTACLE: INTERNAL INTERESTS’ 
CONFLICTS AND DEFECTIVE PARTICIPANT 
MECHANISM
The first practical difficulty is the complex relationship of 
interests among the residents. Under the current public 
participant procedure, residents are rarely integrated 
into the renewal design, and it is therefore hard to 
achieve a consensus.
In the first version of the design, some units of 
private spaces were changed, and some indoor living 
spaces were moved to make room for separate kitchens 
and bathrooms, while the original public space on each 
floor was retained. However, this design was opposed 
by the residents. The residents believed that the private 
living space of the building should be at their own 
disposal, whereas the government’s intervention should 
be restricted only to the public part and should not 
interfere in their private rooms.
In the second version of the design (figure 
3), the public space on each floor was divided into 
independent kitchens and bathrooms as much as 
possible, according to the residents’ requirements, and 
was integrated into the private rooms of the residents, 
so that each household could enjoy individual kitchens 




and bathrooms while keeping the original living area 
from being decreased. However, the inequality of the 
increased kitchen and bathroom areas between each 
household is still inevitable. For example, the No. 5 and 
No. 2 households on the ground floor have the most 
obvious contrast: the original living area of the No. 2 
household is 5.8 m2, and the design plan increases the 
kitchen, bathroom and storage room area by 9.42 m2, 
which is about 162.4% of the original living area; The 
original living area of the No. 5 household is 24.9 m2, and 
the design plan increases the kitchen and bathroom area 
by 8.51 m2, which is about 34.2% of the original living 
area. The increased kitchen and bathroom areas have a 
large gap in proportion, which incited opposition from the 
No. 5 household. They believed that, since their original 
living area was 3.29 times larger than that of the No. 2, 
in order to be fair the kitchen and bathroom allocated 
to them should also be much larger than that of the No. 
2 household. A similar situation also involves the No. 3 
household on the ground floor who did not agree to give 
part of their original living area to the No. 6 household as 
a kitchen and bathroom, although their spatial loss was 
compensated accordingly in the design. The extensive 
work of coordinating such interests tired out the 
designers and slowed down the renewal progress.
An ideal method would be for the residents to 
reach a consensus on the distribution of benefits at 
the beginning and get directly involved in the design 
procedures, and the designer designing, according to 
the residents’ instruction. Currently, an appropriate 
mechanism is lacking. In the present state-owned 
buildings’ renewal project, there are two main links 
involving the residents’ participation (figure 4): 
a) Consultation and entrustment: The renewal plan 
should seek the opinion of all the tenants or owners 
of the buildings, and obtain more than two-thirds of 
the tenants or owners’ approval, before a construction 
team can be entrusted and the implementation begun. 
b) Signing the agreement: For the design and the 
comprehensive implementation plan of the renewal 
projects, the property owner (in most cases the housing 
management department) should sign an agreement 
with all the residents.
However, there is no institutionalized residents’ 
cooperation introduced during the key phase of 
“planning and design” that involves “what to renew”, 
and the phase of “implementation” that involves “how 
to renew and who leads the renewal”. Participation is 
relatively low-level and is concentrated in the later stage 
of the renewal project, resulting in the asymmetry of 
Figure 3:  Current situation (left) and the renewal plan (right) of 
No.620 West Jianguo Road. (Author 2017) 
174
Institutionalizing Co-production in the Conversation 
and Renewal of Residential Urban Heritage in Shangai
information and the lack of communication between 
the design team and the residents. As seen in the “Jukui 
New Village”, when the residents collectively poured into 
the phase of “signing agreements” at the same time and 
were asked to accept the renewal design, long-standing 
conflicts would inevitably break out.
2.2. SECOND OBSTACLE: UNEQUAL DUTIES AND 
MUTUALLY RESTRICTED POWER BETWEEN THE 
RESIDENTS AND THE STATE 
The second difficulty encountered by the renewal 
project was that when submitted for official review, the 
design proposal, which was finally negotiated with the 
residents, was rejected by the government. The reason 
lies in the special system of property rights (figure 5). 
Shanghai’s residential historic buildings are mainly 
state-owned, whose property rights are divided into 
two parts: the ownership belongs to the government, 
and the right to use the house belongs to the residents, 
whose names with corresponding living areas are 
recorded in the official documents. The use-right was 
once given to citizens as welfare during the planned 
economy era, and with the promulgation of a series 
of legal norms in the last decades, the use-right of the 
state-owned houses was gradually recognized as a 
formal part of the property rights. In the current public 
housing lease relationship, the house is practically 
controlled by the use-right holders. For example, the 
residents can enjoy the right to lease the house at a 
very low rent for unlimited time. They can also enjoy the 
full profit (usually dozens of times the rent paid to the 
government), if the house is sublet. But when there is 
an (even very tiny) problem with the house, and it needs 
repairing, the residents will always turn to the property 
owner (the government) for help.
Thus, a paradox is apparent. On the one hand, the 
government undertakes a large number of repairing 
obligations, but is unable to exercise its rights of using 
or disposing of the state-owned houses and cannot 
obtain the benefits brought by the renewal of the 
houses. Without the permission of the use-right holder, 
the government is not even able to repair or renew the 
internal structure or space of the house. For example, 
the previous “water supply” improvement project was 
often resisted by the residents because it might bring 
tiny changes to their living space. The government 
invested a lot but gained no return and has thus, in 
the end, only limited enthusiasm for such initiative. On 
the other hand, unless the government department 
agrees, the residents, as well, cannot carry out house 
repairs or renewals arbitrarily. The responsibilities of the 
government and residents are not equivalent, and their 
power is mutually restricted. As a result, in the past, 
residents’ inappropriate and careless use of the houses 
has been the norm. Some buildings have even been 
treated with an attitude of “let it decay” by the residents 
to obtain the compensation for demolishment.
3. SOLUTION FOR THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
CO-PRODUCING RESIDENTIAL RENEWAL
Given the two obstacles above, this paper refers to 
relevant practical cases and proposes solutions, 
focusing on improving and deepening the mechanism of 
state-community engagement in the residential renewal, 
and adjusting the rights, responsibilities, and benefits of 
the owners and users.




3.1. AUTONOMOUS NEGOTIATING MECHANISM 
AND ACCOMPANYING PLANNING PROCEDURES
Given the residents’ intricate spatial interests, it is 
first necessary to establish an appropriate internal 
negotiating mechanism for subsequent successful 
design work. A suggestion here is to rely on the resident 
committee’s strong social capital, and let the committee 
conduct the coordination autonomously, with the help of 
external professional social organizations.
A valuable reference is the “Family Indoor 
Renovation Project” carried out by the Bund community 
in Huangpu District in 2016, in cooperation with the non-
profit organization Habitat for Humanity. The project 
was technically supported by professional volunteers 
convened by the social organization, and financially 
supported with funds donated by enterprises. The 
community committee first recorded the demands 
and backgrounds of the voluntarily participant families 
and organized the hearings to select the suitable 
households. Then the qualified households reached 
an agreement with the social organization before 
the renewal started on issues such as neighborhood 
mediation, legitimate renovation, and no-sublet. In 
this way, the coordination could be completed at 
the beginning of the project, thus facilitating the 
implementation afterward.
As well, a repair-items-list could be formulated 
along with the establishment of the renewal project. 
Residents living in the same building unit can act 
as a whole and select what needs repairing. After a 
consensus is reached, they should ask for neighbors’ 
opinions and propose the renewal application to the 
government. Then, the relevant departments offer 
investment and qualified construction teams to help 
with implementation. During the design phase, the 
designers and residents can form a temporary co-
working team. Meanwhile, certain financial power and 
authority should be given to the community committee, 
so that they can integrate and utilize the resources and 
manage community affairs independently. 
Successful experience can be drawn from the 
mechanism of elevator construction in old communities 
in Shanghai. It is organized autonomously by  is the 
agreement of 90% of the residents in the same building 
and two-thirds of the residents in the community. After 
completion, the residents can receive a subsidy of up 
to 40% of the cost, to not exceed 240,000 CNY. The 
community committee and relevant departments are 
supposed to assist in the application and approval 
procedures. With a strong initiative, willingness to act and a 
well-developed policy system, in the first half-year of 2019, 
311 old buildings were equipped with elevators effectively.
To acknowledge and include the residents’ 
efforts in the design and obtain a satisfactory renewal 
result, the establishment of the community-planner-
system should be accelerated, the design-workshops 
and regular hearings should be introduced, and the 
residents should be accompanied by professionals and 
engage themselves in the preservation and renewal of 
residential urban heritage.
The Chengxingli renewal project (figure 6) in 
Huangpu district from 2018 brought forward a “one 
design for one household” strategy, in which the 
designers communicated with each household at the 
very beginning of the project, recorded their demands 
and the way they use or change the rooms, and modified 
the design several times to suit the residents’ original 
living conditions. The design is detailed into the types 
of window opening and the location of furniture. In 
fact, a “customized service list” was formulated in the 
renewal, where residents could customize the area of the 
added kitchens and washrooms, the appearance of the 
furniture, as well as the location of the electrical sockets.
3.2. ADJUSTING BENEFITS-RELATIONS AND 
CLARIFYING POWER AND DUTIES BETWEEN THE 
RESIDENTS AND THE GOVERNMENTS
As to adjusting the property relationship, institutional 
economics believes that property rights include all rights 
to resource utilization and compose the “rights bunch”, 
Figure 5:   Analysis of the property of state-held houses in 
Shanghai. (Author 2017) 
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and thus possessing the whole property rights is only 
an ideal. For residential urban heritages, which are 
usually owned by the state, since the use-right holders 
are allowed legally to sublease the houses for profit, the 
property owner could further transfer certain rights to 
use-right holders, including the self-conducted repair 
and renewal, and encourage such actions. Meanwhile, 
governments should adjust the current rent rules to 
set differentiated rents for the sublet and self-occupied 
houses respectively, which can also be seen as taking 
back part of the right of subletting and profiting.
A successful reference here is the “Les Pentes de 
la Croix-Rousse” in Lyon, France. It encourages residents 
of historic neighborhoods to renovate their own houses 
with differentiated subsidies, which are classified into 
two kinds, based on whether the house is for self-
occupation or sublet. For sublet houses, if the owner is to 
rent at a market price, then they will receive no more than 
25 % of the renovation cost; if the owner agrees to rent at 
the price of social houses in nine years, they will receive 
no more than 55 % of the renovation cost; if the owner 
rents at the lowest housing price, they will receive up to 
85 % of the renovation cost. For self-occupied houses, 
the government will offer subsidies according to their 
family incomes. Meanwhile, the city assists the residents 
in the repair management through an NGO. If the tenant 
of the social houses were not able to pay rents in time, 
the NGO would pay for them in advance, so that the 
income of the house-owners would not be affected.
For the balancing of the residents’ and 
government’s responsibilities and rights, a Guideline 
toward Preservation and Utilization can be formulated 
to clarify what kinds of autonomous, self-repair actions 
by residents are approved. Currently, Tongji University 
has been entrusted to formulate the Guideline for 
Preservation and Utilization of Yide Apartment by 
Jing’an District Government and the author is among 
the key team members. The guideline stipulates the key 
protected architectural parts, the permitted items of 
self-conducted repair and their requirements, the repairs 
that should be reported to the government for review 
and their corresponding procedures. It aims to improve 
the working efficiency of historic preservation, regulate 
residents’ daily maintenance activity, and avoid possible 
damages to the urban heritage. 
CONCLUSION
Co-production can meet residents’ demand, utilize 
individual inputs effectively and achieve unexpected 
results when the state is unwilling or unable to deliver 
services (Watson 2014). Meanwhile, co-production 
often goes beyond or counter to the existing rules and 
use conflict tactics. However, co-production may still 
be “public-sector led” in certain contexts, although the 
power balance has fundamentally changed (Albrechts 
2013). Therefore, it is possible to highlight the advantages 
of residents’ own initiative and eliminate potential 
institutional costs and social risks, by institutionalizing 
co-production actively and adjusting current rules. 
The case of No. 620 West Jianguo Road indicates 
the conflicting interests within the communities can 
become an endogenous influence against a successful 
co-production, and the power-relations (property 
included) between the residents and the state can 
be a restraining factor. A good co-production needs 
an effective internal negotiating mechanism for the 
community, the willingness, ability, and recognition 
of the residents’ self-mapping or design, as well as 
empowerment from the state. For this, current rules 
may have to offer more potential openings. Meanwhile, 
the state ought to formulate repair-guidelines to clarify 
and restrict residents’ actions and adjust the relation of 
benefits in the state-society engagement and restore the 
balance of power. 
Noticeable is the work of planners shifting from 
expert driven reviews to “action-research approach” 
Figure 6: Kitchens in Chengxingli can be customized according 
to the residents’ needs (middle). The renovation is based on 




(Huchzermeyer and Misselwitz 2016), as shown 
in Jianguo Road 620. “Mapping and planning” as a 
combination of power and knowledge (Watson 2014) 
also shifts from being held by the state to being shared 
with the community, even partly conducted by residents 
independently, which suggests the empowerment may 
be gradually taking place.
It is worth discussing how to define or redefine 
“community design,” “participatory design,” and 
“community architects” in the specific context, namely 
use-right without property rights.
In Shanghai, the origin of community design is 
similar to that of the US in the 1960s, when it was 
recognized that professional design techniques alone 
are inadequate in resolving social problems (Sanoff 
2006), and that its main purpose, likewise, offering 
design and planning services for residents (often 
economically disadvantaged groups) to involve them in 
shaping and managing their environment (Sanoff 2006). 
More non-profit community organizations are likely to 
subsequently emerge in Shanghai too. However, while 
the capacity of community design centers in the US 
address environmental risks and poverty is diminishing, 
and the groups with economic clout use participatory 
techniques to resist changes, enhance their power and 
secure their quality-of-life (Sanoff 2006), in Shanghai, 
such contradiction lies not between the poor and affluent 
groups, but more in the intricate spatial interests among 
residents and in the power-benefits relations between 
the state and communities. Hence, the establishment 
of a negotiating mechanism and the adjustment of 
the property system are two core dimensions. For a 
successful interior spatial renewal of historic houses, 
residents must be empowered with authority and 
responsibility to take proactive actions instead of 
resistant ones (Sanoff 2006), with residents seen as 
the center in both planning and implementation, which 
resembles community building in the US, to some extent. 
Similarly, in Shanghai’s context, participation 
should focus more on how to achieve an accurate 
balance among residents’ spatial interests via in-depth 
co-work and further realize their full range of needs 
and desires in the design (Milgrom 1998), rather 
than serving as a tool for “defending exclusionary, 
conservative principles” or for “promoting social justice 
and ecological vision” (Sanoff 2006). Consultation is 
inadequate alone since it only represents the lowest 
common solutions, which the majority can tolerate 
(Milgrom 1998).
In co-productive process, “community architects” 
should help individuals be included in the decision-
making process (Milgrom 1998) and assume a more 
proactive role than their traditional counterparts, who 
thought they knew best how people should live (Sanoff 
2006). They should also serve as representatives for the 
residents and advocate for their benefits before the state.
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